EC ください!
Among pandemic-related bankruptcies in the US this year, the retail category has been hit hard.
The insolvencies of well-known retailers like Nieman Marcus, Brooks Brothers and J.Crew came as a surprise because they were such well-established brands.
But it is the Chapter 11 of MUJI USA that unsettles The Rittenhouse House the most.
While living in Japan, we went to MUJI (the real one, 無印良品) for everything.
We grew accustomed to the minimalist design of the products, the simplicity of the store experience, and perhaps most of all, the quietness.
So why didn’t it work in America?
The pandemic has forced a dramatic leap-forward for some industries, especially retail.
This advantaged those who didn’t have to close their doors, or could sell without stores being open or those without stores at all. WMT and AMZN, for example, are looking pretty good.
The unit economics of the MUJI USA model did not work under lockdown conditions.
Paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in rent to landlords in Hudson Yards and The New York Times Building, while selling cedar pencils and linen pajamas is not easy under normal circumstances.
But it’s even tougher balance when you are forced to do it without stores or a decent digital experience or a fully-developed fullfillment/distribution system.
As MUJI USA's bankruptcy unfolded (March store closings, April shipment delays, July chapter eleven) I held out hope that they were working on a pivot.
But that was too much to expect, and now I have to buy my MUJI notebooks from Amazon.
As a true Japanophile, I will likely just bring an empty suitcase on my next trip (Kyoto or Tokyo depending on who books the tickets, me or Magdalena).
I sincerely hope that this is not the ending of MUJI operating in this country, but rather a pivot to a more omnichannel model in which EC has more expanded role.